Índice de capacidades

Deny-by-default: se declara con require capability("scope"). Ver Capacidades e intent para el modelo.

capabilities.syn

-- Doc example: deny-by-default capabilities + faithful scope.
-- Uses `secret` because it proves the model with no network/disk side effects.
intent: "doc example: capabilities and intent"
require secret("APP_*")          -- name-prefix scope: covers APP_KEY, APP_DB, ... only

task read_app_key()
    -- APP_KEY is under the declared APP_* scope → allowed (still redacted, as always)
    give text(secret("APP_KEY", "demo")) == "secret(APP_KEY)"

task read_unscoped()
    -- DB_PASSWORD is NOT under APP_* → denied at the capability check (before any use)
    give secret("DB_PASSWORD")

print("APP_KEY is in scope → " + text(read_app_key()))

test "a capability you declared (in scope) is allowed"
    assert(read_app_key())

test "anything outside the declared scope is denied (deny-by-default)"
    assert_error(read_unscoped)

Capacidad	Gatea	Scope	¿Auto-otorgada en `run`?
`stdout`	`print` / salida	—	sí
`time`	`now`, `format_time`, `sleep`	—	sí
`llm`	`reason`/`decide`/`analyze`/`generate`, `llm_step` (incl. egress al proveedor)	—	sí
`random`	`random`, `random_int`	—	no (tokens/nonces)
`net`	`http*`, `fetch`	host: `net("api.x")`, `net(".x")`, `net("``")`	no
`file`	lectura y escritura	ruta: `file("/data/*")`	no
`file.read` / `file.write`	I/O de mínimo privilegio	glob de ruta	no
`db`	`sql`/`mongo_`/`redis_`	ruta (SQLite) o URL canónica	no
`secret`	`secret(...)`	nombre: `secret("APP_*")`	no
`reveal`	`reveal(...)`	nombre/label (scopeado)	no
`exec`	`run` (shell)	nombre del comando	no
`serve`	`serve on N`	puerto	no (y exigida)
`env`	`env(...)`	nombre / prefijo	no
`stdin`	`read_line`, `ask` de texto libre	—	no

Notas: los scopes de ruta son fieles (los escapes con .. se deniegan). sandbox despoja todo. Un require por-task acota la task a solo lo que declara (∩ el programa). Bajo serve/modo seguro, incluso las auto-otorgadas deben declararse.